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Agricultural protection in rich countries, which had depressed Australian farm incomes 
via its impact on Australia‟s terms of trade, has diminished over the past two decades. So 
too has agricultural export taxation in poor countries, which had the opposite impact on 
those terms of trade. Meanwhile, however, import protection for developing country 
farmers has been steadily growing, and OPEC has been keeping up prices of energy raw 
materials. To what extent are Australian farmers and rural regions still adversely affected 
by farm and non-farm price-distortive policies abroad? This paper draws on new 
evidence on the current extent of those domestic and foreign distortions first to model 
their net impact on Australia‟s terms of trade (TOT, using the World Bank‟s Linkage 
model of the global economy), and second to model the effects of that TOT impact on 
rural vs urban and other regions and households within Australia as of 2004 (using 
Monash‟s multi-regional TERM model of the Australian economy). The results vindicate 
the continuing push by Australia‟s rural communities for multilateral agricultural trade 
liberalization. 
JEL classification: F13; Q18; C68; R13. 
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Throughout the post-World War II period Australian farmers have been discriminated 
against by policies at home and abroad. At home, Australia‟s manufacturing protection 
policies far more than offset the country‟s agricultural support policies, so the farm sector 
and farm household incomes were smaller than they would have been without those 
policies. But domestic reforms in the past three decades have virtually removed that part 
of the discrimination. Abroad, the Australian farm sector was an indirect beneficiary, 
through improved terms of trade, of anti-agricultural policies of developing countries 
such as export taxes, but has been harmed by pro-agricultural policies in other high-
income countries. The former have greatly diminished over the past quarter-century, and 
even the latter have diminished somewhat in their trade impact over the past two decades.  
  This paper summarizes recent research showing the changing extent of policy 
distortions to agricultural incentives in Australia and in the rest of the world, drawing on 
the results of a World Bank multi-country research project, and provides economy-wide 
modeling results of the impact of remaining distortions on farm versus non-farm incomes 
and on rural versus other areas in Australia. 
  The Australian case is different from that of other high-income countries in at 
least two respects. First, agriculture has never been assisted more than non-agricultural 
sectors in Australia, in contrast to virtually all other OECD countries. In that sense it is 
much more like a primary product-exporting developing country. And second, since the   2 
mid-1970s Australian exports of minerals and energy raw materials have been indirectly 
assisted by quotas on petroleum production (agreed to by members of OPEC, the 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries). Hence sectoral policies abroad hurt 
Australian farmers and rural areas not only relative to urban areas but also relative to 
(mainly remote) areas specializing in mining. OPEC‟s policy of output restraint is not 
(yet) subject to negotiation at the World Trade Organization (WTO), so has to be 
accepted as is rather than be treated as a policy amenable to reform. Agricultural policies, 
on the other hand, are an integral part of the WTO‟s current round of multilateral trade 
negotiations and so in principle are subject to reform. Hence information on their effects 
is valuable in that it can be used to generate support for policy reform. Past studies have 
provided information on the effects of those policies on the farm sector and overall 
economy nationally (e.g., Anderson and Martin 2006), but to our knowledge there have 
been no studies that have shown their effects regionally. Yet the degree of price distortion 
varies hugely between products, and hence can be expected to affect regions differentially 
according to their commodity specializations.
1  
The paper is organized as follows. After summarizing results from the World 
Bank‟s price distortion project for Australia and for the rest of the world over the past 
half-century, we describe the two-stage modeling approach used. The first stage involves 
modeling the net impact on Australia‟s terms of trade of distortions to agricultural and 
other goods markets abroad as of 2004 (derived from the World Bank‟s Linkage CGE 
model of the global economy); the second modeling stage uses the TERM CGE multi-
                                                 
1 This approach to examining the impact of foreign policies on different regions and households within a 
national economy, by using the combination of a global model and a compatible national model, will have 
ever-more applications as globalization proceeds. An obvious example is the impact of climate change and 
responses to it by the rest of the world.     3 
regional model of the Australian economy to estimate the regional and net farm vs 
nonfarm income consequences of the terms of trade effects of those discriminatory 
policies as of 2004. We then discuss model results. We point out that while the growth of 
agricultural protection in rich countries has reversed a little recently, developing countries 
as a group have transitioned from effectively taxing their farmers to assisting them 
relative to their manufacturers, particularly via food import restrictions. If this trend 
continues, Australian farmers and rural regions will have even more reason to press for an 
ambitious reform outcome from the agricultural part of the multilateral trade negotiations 
under the WTO.  
 
 
Distortions to agricultural incentives since the 1950s 
 
 
Australia‟s Industries Assistance Commission began calculating estimates of the nominal 
rates of assistance (NRA, the percentage by which government policies have raised gross 
returns to producers above what they would be without the government‟s intervention) 
for major agricultural commodities beginning with the year 1970-71. This series has been 
continued by its successors, the Industry Commission and the Productivity Commission. 
For the years before 1970-71, a comprehensive series is published in Lloyd (1973, pp. 
149-58). It covers the major agricultural commodities for which data were available at the 
time, for the years 1946-47 to 1970-71. The Lloyd and Commission series use essentially 
the same methods. Anderson, Lloyd and MacLaren (2007) bring these series together and   4 
obtain a weighted average NRA for agriculture as a whole. Their results show that the 
average nominal rate of agricultural assistance in Australia rose during the 1950s and 
1960s but subsequently declined so that by the end of the 1990s its average was virtually 
zero (middle line in Figure 1). So too did the dispersion of industry NRAs within the farm 
sector: the standard deviation around the weighted mean peaked at more than 50 percent 
in the early 1970s, but is now less than 0.5 percent (Anderson, Lloyd and MacLaren 
2007).  
It is relative prices and hence relative rates of government sectoral assistance that 
affect producers‟ incentives, not just agricultural prices alone. In a two-sector model an 
import tax has the same effects on the export sector as an export tax (the Lerner (1936) 
Symmetry Theorem), and this carries over to a model that also includes a third sector 
producing only non-tradables (Vousden 1990, pp. 46-47). It was this understanding that 
led Gruen (1968) to point out that raising assistance to agriculture in the presence of high 
assistance to manufacturing could increase rather than reduce national economic welfare. 
For that reason it is necessary to report estimates not only of the average nominal rate of 
assistance (NRA) for the tradable parts of the agricultural sector, but also of the average 
NRA for the tradable parts of all non-agricultural sectors, based on NRA estimates for 
individual industries. With those two sectoral NRAs we can then calculate a Relative 
Rate of Assistance, RRA, defined as: 
(1)    RRA = 100[(1+NRAag
t/100)/(1+NRAnonag
t/100) – 1]                           
where NRAag
t and NRAnonag
t are the average percentage NRAs for the tradables parts 
of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, respectively. Since the NRA cannot be 
less than -100 percent if producers are to earn anything, so too must the RRA. This   5 
measure is useful: if it is below zero, it provides an internationally comparable indication 
of the extent to which the policy regime has an anti-agricultural bias, and conversely 
when the RRA is positive. 
   Estimates of the NRA for manufacturing for the period prior to 1968-69, when 
Tariff Board estimates begin, rely on tariffs only. During 1952 to 1960 there were also 
protective quantitative restrictions on imports of manufactures, but since estimates of the 
protective effects of those import licenses are unavailable, Anderson, Lloyd and 
MacLaren (2007) assume their impact on the average NRA for non-agricultural tradables 
is exactly offset by the negative impact of the ban on key mining exports in those years.
2 
Since Australia‟s imports pre-1969 were almost exclusively manufactures, customs 
revenue as a percentage of the value of all merchandise imports provides a reasonable 
proxy for the country‟s nominal rate of tariff protection for manufacturing. For the period 
since 1968-69, the Productivity Commission and its predecessors provide estimates of 
both nominal and effective rates of assistance to manufacturing, for industry sub-
categories down to the 4-digit level. In addition to tariffs these cover subsidies, bounties, 
discriminatory sales taxes and, from 1982-83, quantitative restrictions and local content 
plans.  
  The weighted average nominal rate of assistance on outputs (NRAs) for the whole 
non-agricultural tradables sector is generated by assuming only (and all) service sectors 
produce non-tradables, and that non-agricultural primary sectors received a zero NRA on 
average. It is shown as the upper line in Figure 1, with the manufacturing-only NRA 
                                                 
2 In years prior to the 1950s, the relatively low international prices of mineral and energy products (World 
Bank 2000), combined with the very high cost of transporting bulky coal and iron ore from Australia to the 
North Atlantic‟s industrial hub, means that the ban on exports of Australian coal and iron ore up to 1960 
was probably redundant. The ban – which had signalled Australia‟s unwillingness to provide industrial raw 
materials to Japan – was removed after the signing of the Australia-Japan trade agreement in 1957.   6 
shown just above it (indicating that the weight of non-farm primary activities is very 
low). The NRAs for both farm and non-farm tradable sectors are used to calculate the 
RRA, using the formula in equation (1) above. That is shown as the lowest of the lines in 
Figure 1. 
These estimates reveal two key facts. First, for all of the post World War II period 
Australian sectoral and trade policies have discriminated against the agricultural sector 
(and even more so the mining sector). Even though production subsidies were given to 
farmers for most years from the early 1950s to the late 1990s, the assistance they received 
was much less than that provided to manufacturing via import barriers. Hence the relative 
rate of assistance (RRA) has been negative. Second, it is clear from Figure 1 that the 
extent of Australian policy discrimination against farmers has more or less continuously 
declined throughout that period and has now almost disappeared. The only manufacturing 
protection remaining is for textiles and motor vehicles, and even those tariffs are 
scheduled for further cuts to low levels in 2010.  
Australia contrasts with other high-income countries. According to new results 
from a World Bank research project that provides results for 75 countries accounting for 
90 percent of global agriculture (Anderson 2009a), most have followed a similar path to 
Australia‟s in the sense of raising their relative rates of assistance to farmers as their 
national incomes have risen. However, except for New Zealand, the RRAs for other high-
income countries have risen from higher bases and to higher levels than for Australia, and 
more so the weaker their economy‟s comparative advantage in agriculture (Figure 2). 
While there is a hint of a structural break to the growth of agricultural protection around 
the time of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture coming into force in 1995, no   7 
other OECD country except New Zealand has made as dramatic a reduction in 
agricultural assistance – in terms of driving the RRA towards zero – as Australia. 
Developing countries, on the other hand, are on average much more like 
Australia, although their RRAs were even lower in the early years of their independence 
from imperial powers, and some have risen even faster than Australia‟s. Indeed as a 
group they have now „overshot‟, in the sense that their average RRA is above zero for 
developing countries as a whole (Figure 3). In the past, those disincentives to developing 
country farmers assisted Australia and other agricultural-exporting countries by making 
farm products scarcer in international markets. By the turn of the century, however, their 
policies were adding to the downward pressure on prices in international food markets 
caused by high-income country policies. 
That is, taken together these estimated RRAs suggest that by 2004 the policies of 
both high-income and developing countries were depressing the international prices of 
farm products. Their weighted average moved from being negative to being positive in 
the 1980s.
3 These facts suggest that the prices received by farmers in an open, non-
distorting country such as Australia were probably depressed in 2004 by policies in the 
rest of the world, although it depends on the distribution of NRAs across commodities. 
To determine their net effects, the new price distortion estimates need to be inserted in a 
model of the world‟s trading nations that is capable of generating their impact on 
Australia‟s terms of trade, which in turn need to be inserted in a model of the Australian 
economy that is disaggregated sectorally and regionally. 
                                                 
3 That timing is consistent with the modelling finding by Tyers and Anderson (1992, Table 6.9) that, as of 
1980-82, the depressing impact on international food prices of positive assistance to rich-country farmers 
was almost exactly offset by the price-raising impact of negative assistance to food producers in developing 






The above suggests that to get a sense of just how much agricultural and trade policies 
abroad are impacting on farmers and others in Australia, a two-stage modeling procedure 
is needed. For the first stage we use a global model to estimate the net impact on 
Australia‟s terms of trade of distortions to agricultural and other goods markets abroad in 
2004 (known as the Linkage Model, described in van der Mensbrugghe 2005). For the 
second stage, a national model with regional details (known as the TERM Model, 
described in Horridge, Madden and Wittwer 2005) is used to estimate the regional 
consequences of the terms of trade effects of those discriminatory policies. Since 
Australia had virtually no sectoral or trade distortions of its own by 2004, there is no need 
to also simulate own-country reform. 
 
The global (Linkage) model 
 
Global results, based on the comparative static version of the LINKAGE model, use a 
modified version of the latest pre-release of the Version 7 database of the Global Trade 
Analysis Project (www.gtap.org), in that the distortions to developing country agriculture 
are replaced with ones from the World Bank‟s new estimates of distortions to agricultural 
incentives (from Anderson and Valenzuela 2008a,b). These simulated global results are   9 
transmitted to the Australian national model via changes in the vectors of import prices 
and export demands. The latter are implemented as vertical shifts in the export demand 
curves (that is, of the willingness to pay for Australian exports – see below).  
 
The Australian (TERM) model 
 
The national results use the Australian TERM model, which is a "bottom-up" CGE model 
with features that enable it to deal with the detailed behavior of producers, consumers and 
government economic agents in many regions of the country. We simulate the impacts of 
the removal of current distortions to world markets on Australia by dividing the national 
economy into 59 regions (Statistical Divisions) and 27 industrial sectors. We also define 
three super-regions of urban, rural and mining localities, based on the ratio of the sectoral 
value added share for each region to the national share of sectoral value added (see 
Appendix Tables 1 and 2 for the regional and sectoral classifications and the regions‟ 
relative sectoral value added shares, respectively). The 13 urban regions comprise just 
over 73 percent of the population and 71 percent of national GDP, and the 13 mining 
regions comprise 9 percent of the nation‟s population and 13 percent of GDP. Thus the 
33 rural regions account for the residual 18 percent of the population and 16 percent of 
GDP.                 
The data structure in TERM allows the model to capture explicitly the behavior of 
industries, households, investors, exporters and the government all at the regional level. 
The model‟s theoretical structure is based on that of the well-known CGE model, ORANI 
(Dixon et al. 1982). Producers in each regional industry are assumed to maximize profits   10 
subject to a production technology that allows substitution between primary factors 
(labor, capital and land) and between geographical sources of supply for intermediate 
inputs. A representative household in each region purchases goods in order to obtain the 
optimal bundle in accordance with its preferences and its disposable income. Investors 
seek to maximize their rate of return. In the short-run, this desire is expressed as a 
positive relationship between regional industry investment and rates of return. In the 
medium- to long-run assumed here, it is expressed as the endogenous physical capital 
supply to each regional industry at exogenous rates of return.  
Commodity demands by foreigners are modeled via export demand functions that 
capture the responsiveness of foreigners to changes in Australian supply prices. 
Economic agents decide on the geographical source of their purchases according to 
relative prices and a nested structure of substitution possibilities. The first choice facing 
the purchaser of a unit of a particular commodity is whether to buy one that has been 
imported from overseas or one that has been produced in Australia. If an Australian 
product is purchased, a second decision is made as to the particular region the commodity 
originates from. It is assumed that Australian-made brands are considerably more 
substitutable than is an Australian brand with a foreign brand. The national data include 
regional margins for transportation and retailing, with the possibility of substitution of the 




   11 
Anderson, Valenzuela and van der Mensbrugghe (2009) present terms of trade results, for 
a wide range of countries including Australia, from the World Bank‟s LINKAGE model 
under a long-run scenario in which world agricultural and other goods market distortions 
as of 2004 are removed. The first three columns of Table 1 report those results for 
Australia. To use the TERM model to assess the implications of that set of price impacts 
at Australia‟s national border for various sectors and regions of its economy, we translate 
into TERM inputs or shocks the two sets of LINKAGE outputs: movements in foreign 
currency prices for Australian imports, and vertical (willingness to pay) movements in 
foreign demand schedules for Australian exports.   
For movements in foreign currency import prices, the communication of results 
between the two models is relatively straightforward. We translate movements in foreign 
currency import prices classified by LINKAGE commodity into movements in foreign 
currency import prices classified by TERM commodity via equation (2): 
 
(2) 
(M) ( )* (M) ( )*
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c r t









c,k H  is a matrix of values showing the distribution of imports of TERM 
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percentage change in the foreign currency price of TERM commodity t (values for which 




c p  are reported in column 2 of 
Appendix Table 3. Notice that in equation (1) the exogenous percentage movements in   12 




cr p ) are assumed to be identical across all 
regions, a feature of our shocks that assists in the interpretation of regional results.   
  
Translating LINKAGE results for foreign currency export prices into TERM 
shocks is more complicated. As Horridge and Zhai (2006) argue with the help of 
Appendix Figure 2, the appropriate things to communicate to the national model are the 
willingness-to-pay shifts implicit in the price and quantity movements produced by the 
global model. Horridge and Zhai show that these can be calculated via the formula: 
 
(3) 
( ) ( )* ( )* ( ) /
Linkage Linkage Linkage Linkage




t fp  is the percentage vertical shift in the export demand schedule for 
LINKAGE commodity t; 
( )* Linkage
t p  is the percentage change in the foreign currency 
export price for LINKAGE commodity t;  
( )* Linkage
t q  is the percentage change in the 
quantity of exports of LINKAGE commodity t; and  
() Linkage
t   is the export demand 
elasticity for LINKAGE commodity t. Unlike national models, where the export demand 
elasticity typically appears as an explicit parameter, in global models like LINKAGE, 
() Linkage
t   is implicit in the theory and parameters governing how agents in each country 
substitute between alternative sources of supply for each commodity. We explain our 
method for calculating 
() Linkage
t   in the Appendix. Column (4) of Table 1 reports our 
() Linkage
t   estimates.    13 
      The results for 
() Linkage
t fp  are translated to vertical shifts for TERM commodities, 
(4)
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c,k H  is a matrix of values showing the distribution of the value of TERM exports 
of commodity c across LINKAGE commodities k; 
(4)
, cr f  is the vertical shift in the TERM 
export demand schedule for commodity c from region r; and 
() Linkage
t fp  is the vertical shift 
in foreign demands for Australian exports implicit in the LINKAGE simulation results 
reported in the first two columns of Table 1. Results are reported in column 1 of 
Appendix Table 3. Like equation (2), equation (4) assumes that the movements in 
commodity-specific export demand schedules (
(4)
, cr f ) are identical across regions. This is 





We use a long-run comparative-static closure of TERM. This closure has the 
following characteristics:    14 
  Physical capital is in elastic supply to each regional industry at exogenous rates of 
return; 
  Agricultural land supplies are exogenous and land rental rates are endogenous; 
  National employment is exogenous and the national real wage is endogenous; 
  National population is exogenous and, subject to this constraint, regional 
populations follow regional employment outcomes;  
  Labour is largely free to move between regions, although there is some regional 
stickiness in labour supply by allowing the gap between the regional wage and the 
national wage to be positively related to the movement in regional employment; 
  Regional industry investment/capital ratios are exogenous and national investment 
is endogenously determined as the sum of regional industry investments; 
  National consumption (public plus private) is a fixed proportion of gross national 
disposable income and, subject to this national constraint, private consumption at 
the regional level is indexed to regional income; and  
  The ratio of real public consumption spending to real private consumption 
spending in each region is exogenous. 
 
 
Results: effects of distortions on incomes of Australian farmers and rural areas 
 
 
To understand the impacts through the terms of trade effects on Australia of the rest of 
the world‟s farm and trade policies, we begin with the macroeconomic effects before   15 
turning to the sectoral and regional results. The macro impacts are decomposed into two 
effects: those attributable to changes in demand for Australian exports (column 1 of Table 
2); and, those attributable to changes in the prices Australia pays for its imports (column 
2). Column 3 reports the sum of those two effects.     
Removal of distortions in global goods markets has a favourable effect on 
Australia‟s terms of trade: they improve by 1.8 percent, made up of a 2.3 percent 
improvement in export prices and offset by a 0.5 percent change in import prices (Table 
2, row 8). The increasing demand for agricultural exports lifts rental rates on agricultural 
land, by almost one-quarter (24 percent, row 14). Together with the increase in the terms 
of trade, this encourages expansion of the long run national capital stock (row 3). With 
the capital stock higher than otherwise, so too is real GDP (row 1). The positive 
movements in real GDP and the terms of trade account for the positive outcome for real 
consumption (row 4), which rises by 0.5 per cent relative to what it would otherwise have 
been. Approximately 0.35 percentage points of the total outcome for real consumption is 
attributable to the positive terms of trade outcome, with the remaining 0.15 percentage 
points due to the increase in real GDP. The strong positive movement in the terms of 
trade allows the real GNE outcome to exceed the real GDP outcome. This accounts for 
the movement towards deficit in the real balance of trade, which is expressed as a 
contraction in the aggregate volume of exports and an expansion in aggregate import 
volume (rows 6 and 7, column 3). The mechanism that achieves this is real appreciation, 
amounting to 2.4 percent (row 9 of Table 2).  
  That real appreciation of the exchange rate means tradable sectors whose prices 
do not rise much could be under pressure to contract. And indeed this is what happens.   16 
The bias towards agriculture in the improvement in Australia‟s terms of trade ensures that 
output of agricultural and food manufacturing industries expand, but the real exchange 
rate appreciation causes other main trade-exposed sectors to contract. This can be seen 
from Figure 5, where it is evident that virtually all agricultural and food industries expand 
(with dairying and rice benefiting most) but other manufacturing output shrinks by about 
1 percent overall, and mining output shrinks by 2 percent.  
Our modelling assumes all regions within Australia experience the same 
commodity-specific percentage changes in export and import prices from removal of 
world agricultural and other trade distortions. As a result, regional differences in the 
industrial composition of local economic activity determine much of the dispersion in 
regional economic impacts.
4 That is, regional income effects are strongly positive for 
rural regions, slightly negative for mining-intensive regions (the less-agricultural regions 
of Western Australia and South Australia, the Northern Territory, and Mackay and 
Fitzroy in Queensland), and mixed for urban regions (Figure 5). The urban results depend 
among other things on the extent to which an urban centre is specialized in servicing 
more the agricultural sector (as with Adelaide and Melbourne) rather than the mining 
sector (as in Perth and Darwin, which is where many miners live when they are not 
working on remote mine sites). In terms of geography, these output results are reported 
also on the map of Australia (Figure 6). 
                                                 
4 Adams, Horridge and Parmenter (2000) show that an industry can make a positive contribution to a 
region‟s relative growth rate if it is a fast (slow)-growing industry and is over (under)-represented in the 
region, or if it grows more quickly in the region than it does in the nation as a whole. In applying the 
LINKAGE model results to the bottom-up regional model TERM, we had no basis for differentiating the 
region-specific shocks to commodity-specific import and export prices. Hence, with the sizes of 
commodity-specific movements in import and export prices the same across regions, the share effect plays 
a dominant role in explaining the above differences in gross regional product (GRP) outcomes.   17 
Notice from Figure 5 that the income gains to rural areas are by no means 
uniform. Indeed there is a wide variation, ranging from less than 0.1 percent in Far North 
Queensland (where mining also occurs – see Appendix Table 2) to more than 4 percent in 
the agriculturally lush Western Districts of Victoria. Again this reflects the regional 
differences in the industrial composition of local economic activity, given the wide range 
of output changes shown in Figure 5. It also correlates with the regions most adversely 
affected by drought recently (see Horridge, Madden and Wittwer 2005) and by Dutch-
disease effects flowing from the mining boom (Horridge and Wittwer 2008). 
 
 
The bottom line 
 
 
The key net effects of the changes reported above are that real net rural incomes in 
Australia would be 1.2 percent higher, and real returns to agricultural land in particular 
would be 24 percent higher, in the absence of price distortions resulting from agricultural 
and trade policies in the rest of the world.
5 Clearly those policies abroad are hurting 
Australia‟s rural households, adding to the adverse impact of drought over recent years 
(Horridge, Madden and Wittwer 2005, Horridge and Wittwer 2008), but to varying 
extents depending on the product specialization of various regions and households. The 
upturn in international food prices in 2007-08 brought a welcomed reprieve, which 
Australian farmers and trade negotiators hope will help revive the agricultural part of the 
                                                 
5 Even though incomes in mining regions would be 0.7 percent lower on average, those regions currently 
enjoy incomes that are substantially higher than in the rest of Australia and so could well absorb that shock.   18 
multilateral trade negotiations under WTO‟s Doha Development Agenda. The above 
results vindicate the continuing push by Australia‟s rural communities for multilateral 
agricultural trade liberalization, and give additional reason for doing so to those regions 
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Table 1: Impact of rest of world‟s trade policies on prices and volume of 
Australia‟s exports and imports, 2004 
 
(LINKAGE Model results, long-run percentage change relative to baseline) 
 





















Paddy rice  4.0  28.7  n.a.  6.2 
Wheat  4.2  -7.9  n.a.  7.7 
Other grains  4.3  29.1  n.a.  6.7 
Oilseeds  4.3  -34.2  5.2  5.5 
Sugar cane   n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  6.6 
Plant-based fibres  4.2  27.6  -1.3  8.3 
Vegetables and fruits  4.2  4.5  2.3  5.3 
Other crops  4.2  0.4  1.2  5.5 
Cattle sheep etc.  4.0  -7.9  8.3  5.2 
Other livestock  4.0  -11.0  1.0  5.4 
Raw milk  n.a.  n.a.  -1.3  5.5 
Wool  4.2  10.9  10.0  3.7 
Beef and sheepmeat  3.3  59.3  11.2  5.4 
Other meat products  3.2  19.4  0.6  5.0 
Vegetable oils and fats  2.6  12.6  1.0  5.5 
Dairy products  3.2  243.8  12.1  5.5 
Processed rice  2.9  -3.2  3.6  6.1 
Refined sugar  2.9  6.2  1.1  8.2 
Other food, beverages and tobacco  2.7  54.7  3.4  5.4 
Other primary products  2.6  -10.2  4.0  6.0 
Textiles and wearing apparel  2.3  6.5  -0.3  5.7 
Other manufacturing  2.3  -6.5  0.1  5.7 
Services  2.6  -10.9  -0.3  2.9 
 
Source: Anderson, Valenzuela and van der Mensbrugghe (2009)   23 





 Due to changes in: 







Real GDP at market prices  0.19  -0.03  0.15 
Aggregate employment  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Aggregate capital stock  0.32  -0.06  0.27 
Real consumption (private & public)  0.63  -0.14  0.49 
Real investment  0.64  -0.09  0.54 
Real exports  -0.67  -0.11  -0.77 
Real imports  1.60  -0.56  1.04 
Terms of trade  2.30  -0.53  1.77 
Real exchange rate  2.54  -0.16  2.37 
Nominal exchange rate (foreign currency/$AUD)  2.08  -0.02  2.06 
Consumption deflator (private & public)  0.01  -0.03  -0.02 
Investment price deflator  -0.29  -0.01  -0.30 
Rental price of capital  -0.45  0.00  -0.45 
Rental price of land  23.7  0.56  24.3 
 
Source: Authors‟ calculations using the TERM Model   24 
Table 3: Aggregate sectoral real income effects, Australia, 2004 
(percent) 
 
   Change in net 
income  
Real net farm income (agricultural value 
added) 
17.45 
Real net non-farm income (non-
agricultural value added) 
-0.08 
       of which food processing     6.47 
Overall real national income
a  0.49 
 
 
a Nominal GDP at market prices, deflated by the price of consumption 
 
Source: Authors‟ calculations using the TERM Model 
 
   25 
Figure 1: Nominal rates of assistance to manufacturing, all non-agricultural tradables, all 
agricultural tradable industries, and relative rate of assistance,











































































































































a The RRA is defined as 100*[(100+NRAag
t)/(100+NRAnonag
t) – 1] 
 
Source: Anderson, Lloyd and MacLaren (2007) 
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Figure 2: Relative rates of assistance to agriculture,
a Australia and other high-income 














          (-0.76)               (-0.28)              (0.10)                   (0.69)                      (0.79) 
 
 
a The RRA is defined as 100*[(100+NRAag
t)/(100+NRAnonag
t) – 1]. The numbers in 
brackets are indexes of agricultural comparative advantage, defined as net exports as a 
ratio of the sum of exports and imports of agricultural and processed food products 
(hence bound between -1 and +1), averaged over the twenty years from 1960, from 
Sandri, Valenzuela and Anderson (2006). 
 
Source: Anderson, Lattimore, Lloyd and MacLaren (2009), Gardner (2009), Hayami and 
Honma (2009), Josling (2009).   27 
Figure 3: Relative rates of assistance to agriculture,
a high-income
b and developing 









1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04
Developing countries HIC+ECA HIC+ECA incl. Decoupled
 
 
a The RRA is defined as 100*[(100+NRAag
t)/(100+NRAnonag
t) – 1] 
 
b HIC+ECA is the sum of high-income OECD member countries plus Turkey and the 
transition economies of Europe and Central Asia (that is, Eastern Europe, and the former 
Soviet Union). 
 
Source: Anderson (2009a)   28 
























Source: Authors‟ TERM Model results 
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Figure 5: Regional income impacts in Australia, 2004 
(percent change) 
 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Rural Urban Mining  30 

































































Source: Authors‟ TERM Model results. See Appendix Table 1 for names of regions.   31 
APPENDIX: Derivation of export demand elasticities implicit in LINKAGE’s 
parameters and theoretical structure 
 
Economic agents within each country in LINKAGE face a two-stage sourcing decision 
problem. This is described by Appendix Figure 1. First, agents assemble a composite 
commodity i via a CES aggregation of domestic commodity i and a composite of 
imported commodity i. Second, the composite import is assembled from alternative 
foreign sources via a CES aggregation function. 
Following the approach outlined in Dixon and Rimmer (2002, pp. 222-25) we 
derive the Australia-specific export demand elasticities implicit in LINKAGE as follows. 
On the assumption that only the price of the Australian good is varying, from the familiar 
form for the linearised cost-minimising demand equations implicit in the economic 
problem represented in the bottom nest in Appendix Figure 1, we know that demand for 
the Australian good is given by: 
(1) 
(2)




, , , , (1 ) i Aust i Imp i i Aust i Aust x x S p      
where  , i Aust S  is Australia‟s share in world trade in i. 
From the top nest, we know that demand for the imported good is given by: 
(3) 
(1)
,, () i Imp i i i Imp i x x p p      
On the assumption that only the price of the Australian good is varying (3) simplifies to: 
(4) 
(1)
, , , , , , () i Imp i i i Aust i Aust i Imp i Aust i Aust x x S p S S p        32 
which simplifies to: 
(5) 
(1)
, , , , i Imp i i i Aust i Dom i Aust x x S S p    
 
Finally, we assume that demand for Xi is sensitive to its own price. We represent this 
with the following constant elasticity demand schedule 
(6)  i i i xp    
Assuming that only the price of the Australian good is varying, this simplifies to: 
(7)  , , , i i i Aust i Imp i Aust x S S p    
Substitute (7) and (4) into (2) 
(8) 
(1) (2)
, , , , , , , [ (1 )] i Aust i i Aust i Imp i i Aust i Dom i i Aust i Aust x S S S S S p         
 
In equation (8),  , i Aust p  is the purchaser‟s price in the foreign country of Australian 
good i. Movements in this price can be divided into two parts: movements in the f.o.b 
price of Australian good i, and movements in transaction charges and taxes related to 
getting the good from Australia to the user in the foreign country. In the absence of 
changes in such charges and taxes,  , i Aust p  depends only on   ,
fob
i Aust p , the percentage change 
in the f.o.b price of Australian good i, and  ,
fob
i Aust S , the share of the f.o.b price in the foreign 
country purchaser‟s price: 
(9)  , , ,
fob fob
i Aust i Aust i Aust p S p   
Substituting (9) into (8) we have: 
(10) 
(1) (2)
, , , , , , , , [ (1 )]
fob fob
i Aust i i Aust i Imp i i Aust i Dom i i Aust i Aust i Aust x S S S S S S p           33 
Hence, the Australian export demand elasticity for good i implicit in the LINKAGE 
theory and database is: 
( ) (1) (2)
, , , , , , [ (1 )]
Linkage fob
t i i Aust i Imp i i Aust i Dom i i Aust i Aust S S S S S S          
and so its value can be determined from the LINKAGE values of: 
i    The elasticity of demand for good i (irrespective of source) in the foreign country.  
Typically, we might expect the value for  i  to be low, perhaps around 0.10. 
, i Aust S   Australia‟s share in world trade for good i. For wool, the value for  , i Aust S  is quite 
high (around 0.65). For most commodities it is quite low (around 0.05)  
, i Imp S   The import share in world usage of commodity i. A typical value for  , i Imp S  is 
around 0.15. 
, i Dom S   The domestic sourcing share in world usage of commodity i (=1- , i Imp S ). A typical 
value for  , i Dom S  is around 0.85. 
(1)
i    The elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported varieties of good i. 
In LINKAGE, a typical value for 
(1)
i   is around 4.  
(2)
i    The elasticity of substitution between alternative foreign sources of supply for 
imported good i. In LINKAGE, a typical value for 
(2)
i   is around 8.  
,
fob
i Aust S   The share of the f.o.b price in the foreign country purchaser‟s price of good i. A 
typical value for  ,
fob
i Aust S  is 0.7.   
Hence, in LINKAGE, a typical value for the Australian export demand elasticity for 
commodity t is: 
() [0.10 0.05 0.15 4 0.05 0.85 8 (1 0.05)] 0.7 7.7
Linkage
t              34 
Appendix Table 1: Regional and sectoral classification in the TERM model of Australia‟s 
economy 
Regional classification  Sectoral classification 
     
Rural  Mining  1. Sheep 
6. Northern (NSW)  2. Hunter (NSW)  2. Wheat 
7. North West (NSW)  3. Illawarra (NSW)  3. Other grains 
8. Central West (NSW)  12. Far West (NSW)  4. Rice 
9. South East (NSW)  32. Fitzroy (QLD)  5. Beef cattle 
10. Murrumbidgee (NSW)  34. Mackay (QLD)  6. Dairy cattle 
11. Murray (NSW)  35. Northern (QLD)  7. Other livestock 
15. Barwon (VIC)  37. North West (QLD)  8. Cotton 
16. Western District (VIC)  44. Northern (SA)  9. Vegetables and fruit 
17. Central Highlands (VIC)  46. Rest of NT (NT)  10. Sugar cane 
18. Wimmera (VIC)  48. South West (WA)  11. Other agriculture 
19. Mallee (VIC)  52. South East (WA)  12. Mining 
20. Loddon-Campaspe (VIC)  53. Central (WA)  13. Meat products manuf 
21. Goulbourn (VIC)  54. Pilbara (WA)  14. Dairy products manuf 
22. Ovens-Murray (VIC)  55. Kimberley (WA)  15. Fruit and vegetable manuf 
23. East Gippsland (VIC)    16. Oils and fats manuf 
24. Gippsland (VIC)    17. Flour and cereal manuf 
28. West Moreton (QLD)  Urban  18. Other food, bev. & tobacco 
29. Wide Bay-Burnett (QLD)  1. Sydney (NSW)  19. Sugar refining 
30. Darling Downs (QLD)  4. Richmond Tweed (NSW)  20. Woven fibres 
31. South West (QLD)  5. Mid North Coast (NSW)  21. Textiles, clothing & footwear 
33. Central West (QLD)  13. ACT  22. Other manufacturing 
36. Far North (QLD)  14. Melbourne (VIC)  23. Utilities 
39. Outer Adelaide (SA)  25. Brisbane (QLD)  24. Construction 
40. Yorke, Lower North (SA)  26. Gold Coast (QLD)  25. Dwellings 
41. Murray Lands (SA)  27. Sunshine Coast (QLD)  26. Public admin. & defence 
42. South East (SA)  38. Adelaide (SA)  27. Services 
43. Eyre (SA)  45. Darwin (NT)   
49. Lower Great Southern (WA)  47. Perth (WA)   
50. Upper Great Southern (WA)  56. Greater Hobart (TAS)   
51. Midlands (WA)     
57. Southern (TAS)     
58. Northern (TAS)     
59. Mersey-Lyell (TAS)     
 
a Numbers for regions refer to those shown on the map in Figure 6   
 
Source: TERM model‟s database, drawn from Australian Bureau of Statistics data  35 
Appendix Table 2: Sectoral shares of gross regional product and regional shares of GDP 




Sectoral shares (%, relative to 









culture  Mining 
Other 
sectors 
Rural  15.9  19.1 
 CentlWestQLD  14.92  0.1  0.56  0.1  0.1 
 UpperGtSthWA  14.14  0.1  0.58  0.1  0.1 
 MidlandsWA  13.60  0.3  0.52  0.4  0.3 
 EyreSA  10.96  0.2  0.73  0.2  0.2 
 YorkLwrNthSA  10.33  0.2  0.74  0.2  0.2 
 WimmeraVIC  9.80  0.4  0.72  0.3  0.4 
 SouthEastSA  8.78  0.3  0.79  0.3  0.3 
 WestnDistVIC  7.99  0.5  0.82  0.5  0.5 
 SouthWestQLD  7.80  0.1  0.39  0.3  0.1 
 SouthernTAS  7.36  0.2  0.86  0.1  0.2 
 MalleeVIC  6.97  0.3  0.87  0.4  0.3 
 DarlDownsQLD  6.41  1.1  0.81  1.1  1.1 
 NorthernNSW  6.25  0.9  0.89  0.8  0.9 
 MurrayLndsSA  6.20  0.3  0.90  0.3  0.3 
 LowerGtSthWA  5.49  0.3  0.87  0.3  0.3 
 NorthWestNSW  5.42  0.6  0.81  0.5  0.6 
 GoulbournVIC  4.87  0.8  0.95  0.9  0.8 
 EastGippsVIC  4.55  0.3  0.93  0.3  0.3 
 MurrayNSW  3.92  0.6  0.98  0.5  0.6 
 MrmbidgeeNSW  3.58  0.7  0.99  0.7  0.7 
 WideByBntQLD  3.51  1.3  0.89  0.9  1.3 
 OtrAdelaidSA  3.38  0.6  0.99  0.5  0.6 
 MerseyLylTAS  3.19  0.6  0.93  0.4  0.6 
 WMoretonQLD  3.11  0.4  0.88  0.3  0.4 
 CentrlWstNSW  2.98  0.9  0.87  0.9  0.9 
 NorthernTAS  2.79  0.7  1.01  0.5  0.7 
 OvensMrryVIC  2.33  0.5  1.04  0.4  0.5 
 GippslandVIC  2.19  0.8  0.95  1.0  0.8 
 FarNorthQLD  2.03  1.2  0.99  1.0  1.2 
 SouthEastNSW  1.76  1.0  1.06  0.9  1.0 
 CentHilndVIC  1.64  0.6  1.05  0.6  0.6 
 LoddonCmpVIC  1.54  1.0  1.04  0.7  1.0 
 BarwonVIC  1.34  1.3  1.07  1.2  1.3 
           
   36 




Sectoral shares (%, relative to 













Mining        13.1  9.0 
 PilbaraWA  0.06  11.1  0.15  1.7  0.2 
 KimberleyWA  1.83  8.69  0.30  0.4  0.2 
 FarWestNSW  0.97  7.39  0.44  0.2  0.1 
 SouthEastWA  1.46  6.90  0.47  0.5  0.3 
 NorthWestQLD  3.84  6.81  0.39  0.3  0.2 
 MackayQLD  1.17  6.65  0.50  1.4  0.8 
 CentralWA  3.39  6.24  0.46  0.5  0.3 
 NorthernSA  2.30  4.87  0.61  0.5  0.4 
 FitzroyQLD  2.06  4.29  0.67  1.6  1.0 
 RoNT  0.68  4.07  0.74  0.8  0.7 
 SouthWestWA  1.39  2.40  0.86  1.1  1.0 
 IllawarraNSW  0.14  2.0  1.05  1.8  2.0 
 NorthernQLD  1.13  1.88  0.92  1.0  1.0 
 HunterNSW  0.36  1.51  0.98  3.1  3.0 
           
Urban  71.0  72.0 
 SydneyNSW  0.05  20.7  1.12  22.0  20.7 
 ACT  0.02  1.6  1.12  2.0  1.6 
 AdelaideSA  0.21  5.5  1.11  4.6  5.5 
 GrtHobartTAS  0.48  1.0  1.10  0.7  1.0 
 MelbourneVIC  0.11  18.2  1.10  17.7  18.2 
 RichTweedNSW  0.80  1.1  1.09  1.8  1.1 
 MidNthCstNSW  0.76  1.4  1.09  0.8  1.4 
 GoldCoastQld  0.54  2.5  1.07  2.0  2.5 
 BrisbaneQLD  0.11  8.8  1.07  8.2  8.8 
 SunshnCstQld  0.72  1.4  1.04  1.1  1.4 
 PerthWA  0.21  7.3  0.97  7.8  7.3 
 DarwinNT  1.04  0.3  0.88  0.5  0.3 
           
National average 






Urban = Capital cities and other regions with relative share >1.03 unless rural relative 
share is greater (viz. BarwonVIC, SouthEastNSW, CentHilndVIC, LoddonCmpVIC, 
OvensMrryVIC) 
 
Mining = regions with relative share >1.5 unless rural relative share is greater 
(SouthWestQLD, CentrlWstNSW), or it is a capital city (viz. Perth, Darwin) 
 
Source: TERM model‟s database, drawn from Australian Bureau of Statistics data   37 
Appendix Table 3: Commodity-specific import price shocks, and estimates of export 
price impacts on Australia, 2004 
 
Australian TERM Model sector: 
Vertical 
(willingness-to-
pay) shifts in 
export demand  
Changes in 
import prices    
1. Sheep  9.93  10.59   
2. Wheat  3.14  0.00   
3. Other grains  5.02  2.58   
4. Rice  8.33  0.00   
5. Beef cattle  2.34  8.25   
6. Dairy cattle  0.00  -1.31   
7. Other livestock  1.74  1.03   
8. Cotton  7.31  -1.30   
9. Vegetables and fruit  5.03  2.32   
10. Sugar cane  0.00  0.00   
11. Other agriculture  4.28  0.94   
12. Mining  0.75  4.01   
13. Meat products manufacturing  11.18  5.90   
14. Dairy products manufacturing  29.08  12.05   
15. Fruit and vegetable manufacturing  11.43  3.41   
16. Oils and fats manufacturing  4.85  0.98   
17. Flour and cereal manufacturing  10.74  3.52   
18. Other food, beverages, and tobacco manufacturing  11.43  3.41   
19. Sugar refining  3.66  1.10   
20. Woven fibres  7.14  9.95   
21. Textiles, clothing and footwear  3.45  -0.34   
22. Other manufacturing  1.10  0.09   
23. Utilities  -1.37  -0.27   
24. Construction  -1.37  -0.27   
25. Dwellings  -1.37  -0.27   
26. Public administration and defence  -1.37  -0.27   
27. Services  -1.37  -0.27    
 
Source: Derived by the authors‟ from Linkage model results reported above in Table 1 
(from Anderson, Valenzuela and van der Mensbrugghe 2009).   38 
























i X   is a particular country‟s demand for commodity i; 
CES  is a constant elasticity of substitution function; 
, i Dom X   is the quantity of commodity i sourced from domestic producers; 
,Imp i X   is the quantity of commodity i sourced from foreign producers; 
(1)
i    is the Allen elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported i; 
(2)
i    is the Allen elasticity of substitution between alternative foreign sources of 
imported i; 
, i Aust X   is the quantity of imported i that is supplied by Australia; and  
, ir X   is the quantity of imported i that is supplied by country r. 
 
Source: van der Mensbrugghe (2005)
Xi 
CES 
Xi,dom  Xi,imp 
CES 




(2)  39 

































t fp  is the percentage vertical shift in the export demand schedule for 
LINKAGE commodity t; 
( )* Linkage
t p  is the percentage change in the foreign currency 
export price for LINKAGE commodity t;  
( )* Linkage
t q  is the percentage change in the 
quantity of exports of LINKAGE commodity t; and  
() Linkage
t   is the export demand 
elasticity for LINKAGE commodity t. 
 
 
Source: Horridge and Zhai (2005)  
( ) ( )* ( )* ( ) /
Linkage Linkage Linkage Linkage
t t t t fp p q  